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Abstract. Searle represents constitutive norms as count-as condi-
tionals, written as ‘X counts as Y in context C’. Grossi et al. study a
class of these conditionals as ‘in context C, X is classified as Y ’.
In this paper we propose a generalization of this relation among
count-as conditionals, classification and context, by defining a class
of count-as conditionals as ‘X in context C0 is classified as Y in
context C’. We show that if context C0 can be different from con-
text C, then we can represent a larger class of examples, and we
have a weaker logic of count-as conditionals.
1 Count-as conditionals, classification and context
Searle [7] argues that there is a distinction between two types of rules.
“Some rules regulate antecedently existing forms of behaviour.
For example, the rules of polite table behaviour regulate eating,
but eating exists independently of these rules. Some rules, on
the other hand, do not merely regulate an antecedently existing
activity called playing chess; they, as it were, create the pos-
sibility of or define that activity. The activity of playing chess
is constituted by action in accordance with these rules. The in-
stitutions of marriage, money, and promising are like the insti-
tutions of baseball and chess in that they are systems of such
constitutive rules or conventions” ([7], p. 131).
For Searle, regulative and constitutive norms are related via in-
stitutional facts like marriage, money and private property. They
emerge from an independent ontology of “brute” physical facts
through constitutive rules of the form “such and such an X counts
as Y in context C” where X is any object satisfying certain con-
ditions and Y is a label that qualifies X as being something of an
entirely new sort. E.g., “X counts as a presiding official in a wed-
ding ceremony”, “this bit of paper counts as a five euro bill” and
“this piece of land counts as somebody’s private property”. Regula-
tive norms refer to these institutional facts. E.g., consider a society
which believes that a field fenced by an agent counts as the fact that
the field is the agent’s property. The fence is a physical “brute” fact,
while being a property is an institutional fact. Regulative norms for-
bidding trespassing refer to the abstract concept of property rather
than to fenced fields.
Grossi et al. [4] study the relation between on the one hand count-
as conditionals and on the other hand classification and context. They
formalize a class of count-as conditionals as contextual classifica-
tions, and thus do not claim that all count-as conditionals can be rep-
resented in this way. Roughly, as we understand it, their idea of clas-
sification is that X and Y are interpreted as sets (of facts, objects,
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events, actions, etc) and that ‘X is classified as Y ’, or ‘X is-a Y ’
for short, is interpreted as ‘the set of interpretations of X is a sub-
set of the set of interpretations of Y ’. Thus, classification is the is-a
relation frequently studied in conceptual modeling, for example as
a subsumption relation in type theory, or as a T-Box expression in
description logics.
Moreover, Grossi et al. use modal logic to represent their count-as
conditionals as contextual classifications. They represent X and Y as
propositions, and the context as a modal operator (to be precise, as a
particular kind of KD45 modality). Roughly, representing the classi-
fication relation as a material implication ‘X → Y , they propose the
following definition.
‘X counts as Y in context C’ is represented by [C](X → Y ).
For example, consider a regulative norm stating that vehicles are
forbidden in the park, and the constitutive norm ‘bicycles count as
vehicles in the park’. This count-as conditional classifies bicycles as
vehicles in the context of being in the park, and can be formalized as
[park](bicycles→ vehicles).
The logic of Grossi et al. turns out to be much stronger than other
logics of count-as conditionals, such as the one of Jones and Ser-
got [5]. In Jones and Sergot’s study of count-as conditionals, the logic
of count-as conditionals is very weak. It just satisfies replacements of
logical equivalents, left disjunction and right conjunction. Moreover,
they are inclined to accept transitivity. In addition, the logic of Grossi
et al. satisfies, for example, reflexivity and contraposition.
We believe that there are two important advantages in representing
count-as conditionals as contextual classifications. The first advan-
tage is that it may help to better understand constitutive norms. Defin-
ing count-as conditionals as contextual classifications might lead to
a more precise characterization of count-as conditionals – though it
will not cover the whole class of count-as conditionals.
The second advantage of defining count-as conditionals as con-
textual classifications is that it may help us to understand how count-
as conditionals are related to regulative norms like obligations and
permissions, which is one of the main open questions in normative
systems. Since regulative norms can be defined as classifications of
behaviors in obligatory, permitted and unnormed ones, count-as con-
ditionals as contextual classifications may explain this relation.
Given these two advantages, we are interested in generalizing the
class of count-as conditionals that can be considered as contextual
classifications. One reason to look for generalizations is that the for-
malization does not seem to take Searle’s distinction between brute
and institutional facts into account. For example, since X are brute
facts and Y are institutional facts, this distinction may suggest that
X and Y themselves refer to distinct contexts. Another reason is that
it does not seem straightforward to represent examples. For example,
what is the context in “this bit of paper counts as a five euro bill” or
in “this piece of land counts as somebody’s private property”?
2 Contexts as views
To generalize the notion of count-as conditionals as contextual clas-
sifications, we again make use of the terminology and methodology
developed in conceptual modeling. As we already observed, classifi-
cation is a central relation used in conceptual modeling. In software
engineering, for example, the world (or a system) is modeled using
various models of the Unified Modelling Language (UML) (class
diagrams, sequence diagrams, etc.), and the is-a relation is used to
define classification of concepts in class diagrams.
In this paper we use the notion of viewpoint and view to give an
interpretation of context. A viewpoint is a particular way to look at
the world [1]. For example, a structural viewpoint only describes the
things staying the same over time, an action or process viewpoint de-
scribes the behavior over time, a brute viewpoint describes only brute
facts, an institutional viewpoint describes only institutional facts, a
power viewpoint describes the world in terms of powers of agents, a
dependency viewpoint describes the world in terms of dependencies
among actors, etc. Such a viewpoint is associated with a stakeholder
having particular concerns; this aspect is not further discussed here.
Each viewpoint gives a view on the system or the world.
There are two issues in conceptual modeling: defining each of
these models or views, and defining the relations among them. In
practice, it is the latter which is most problematic [3]. System de-
scriptions often comprise many heterogeneous models and other de-
scriptions, with ill-defined or completely lacking relations, inconsis-
tencies, and a general lack of coherence and vision. UML for exam-
ple does not define the relations among its models (nor does it define
a semantics for its models).
In this interpretation, ‘X counts as Y in context C’ is interpreted
as ‘X counts as Y in viewpoint C’. Our notion of context as view
seems to be compatible with the framework of Grossi et al. In this
interpretation, the conditional is interpreted as ‘X is classified as Y
in viewpoint C’. However, the count-as conditional can be used only
to classify concepts within a single view, not to relate concepts in
two or more views.
3 Count-as as relations among contexts or views
Generalizing the contextual classification to incorporate relations
among contexts is straightforward. If we represent the classification
relation again as a conditional ‘X → Y , then we propose the follow-
ing definition.
‘X in context C0 counts as Y in context C’ is represented by
[C0]X → [C]Y .
The following examples illustrate our definition. The third exam-
ple illustrates how counts-as conditionals can be used to define prop-
erties of regulative norms too.
1. [brute](‘p is a piece of paper’) → [institutional](‘p is money’):
This piece of paper p counts as money. The contexts or views are
the physical world and social (institutional) reality, respectively.
2. [facts](‘this is a piece of paper’) → [actions](‘using the piece of
paper for paying’): This piece of paper can be used to pay for
things. The contexts or views are facts and actions, respectively.
3. [brute](‘the occurrence of behavior p’) → [deontic](‘p is a viola-
tion’): Behavior p counts as a violation. The contexts or views are
physical world and deontic reality, respectively.
The context or view C0 often refers to the world of physical (ob-
servable) facts. As an abbreviation, we can thus use ‘X counts as Y
in context C’ to mean that ‘X in context ‘brute facts’ counts as Y
in context C’. Moreover, as a first approximation of the relation be-
tween count-as conditionals, classification and context, we can use
the following definition:
‘X counts as Y in context C’ is represented by (X → [C]Y ).
The advantage of this definition is that we can compare the logi-
cal properties among count-as conditionals of our proposal with the
existing ones in the literature. In this case we end up with a weaker
logic than the one proposed by Grossi et al., since we no longer have
reflexivity or contraposition. It is more in line with earlier proposals,
such as the approach of Jones and Sergot.
4 Concluding remarks
Constitutive norms play an important role in normative systems like
organizations and institutions, which have received much attention in
artificial intelligence and multi-agent systems. According to Searle,
the simple mechanism of count-as conditionals can explain the com-
plexity of the construction of social reality. This aspect of constitutive
norms does not get a satisfactorily explanation in Grossi et al.’s defi-
nition of count-as conditional as a contextual classification. It is hard
to believe that all complex mechanisms found in social reality, can
be explained by classifications only.
When count-as conditionals act also as bridges between contexts
or views, then they can be used to define new contexts from exist-
ing ones. They can be used to relate for example observable brute
facts and institutional facts, or observable and legal facts. This at least
partly explains why constitutive norms play such an important role
in the construction of social reality. However, there are still aspects
of count-as conditionals which cannot be satisfactorily explained by
our generalized contextual classifications. For example, as we have
shown in [2], constitutive norms can also be used to formalize how
normative systems like organizations can regulate their own evolu-
tion. How to incorporate this aspect is subject of further research.
Another subject of further research is the logical analysis of
counts-as conditionals as contextual classifications. We do not have
that X counts as X , the absence of this reflexivity property was sug-
gested also by Jones and Sergot’s analysis. We thus need a logical
framework of conditionals that not necessarily satisfy this property,
such as the framework of input/output logic [6].
Finally, a subject of further research is to examine relationships
between concepts. For example, the context [facts] consists of the
contexts [brute] and [institutional]. Existing logics of context may be
useful here.
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